I was not able to attend Tuesday morning’s lecture for the League of Women Voters Great Decisions lecture series. I went to Richmond to have lunch with my sister. I could have listened to the lecture through the Zoom link on my phone, but, well, I didn’t feel like it. I’m a slug. Anyway, I’ll give you some information from the Foreign Policy Association briefing book. It’s good background information and I was smarter after I read it.
The essay was written by David M. Lampton, Professor Emeritus at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), who headed China Studies and was Hyman Chair until 2018. Now he is Senior Research Fellow at the School’s Foreign Policy Institute. He also has been President of the National Committee on US-China Relations in New York and Chairman of the Asia Foundation in San Francisco. Author of numerous books and articles, his most recent volume, with Professors Selina Ho and Cheng-Chwee Juik, is entitled: Rivers of Iron: Railroads and Chinese Power in Southeast Asia ((Oakland CA: University of California Press, 2020).
The main point of his essay is that the governments of the US and China are now turning to strategies to deal with each other reminiscent of earlier periods of intense big power competition in which the minimal goal of each is to deny dominance to the other and the maximum goal is to achieve dominance for itself. He says that it is unclear how long this period of increasing tension will last but that it is likely to be long – and expensive.
He compares the new era to two past foreign policy periods – the Cold War of the second half of the 20th century and the world of “spheres of influence” in the 19th century and much of the 20th. He notes that the context in which America and China now are operating is different from these earlier eras in three important ways:
The degree of global, economic interdependence is greater than ever before, seen in intricate supply chains upon which everyone depends. Today it is harder than ever to inflict damage on one’s adversary without harming oneself and friends.
The big powers, and many second-tier powers, have weapons of mass destruction or soon could develop them if they were to determine their security required them to do so. Escalation and proliferation are enormous present dangers.
The world faces existential global issues that could extinguish or severely disrupt life as we know it if cooperation is not forthcoming. One need look no further than climate change and environmental deterioration.
He goes on to say that Americans will have to make major decisions – and soon – to address these issues:
What fraction of national wealth are Americans willing to spend on this new contest? At the height of the Cold War, US defense spending averaged about 10% of GDP, generally falling to 3-5% thereafter. The PRC is economically and intellectually more dynamic than the Soviet Union ever was (or that Russia currently is). (MY NOTE: For insight into the long-term domestic and international effects of the Cold War, read The Fifty-Year Wound: How America's Cold War Victory Has Shaped Our World by Derek Leebaert. Published 10 years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the book looks at the price (both economic and social) that Americans paid for the Cold War.
How does the US forge sufficient domestic cohesion to be effective abroad? People from all across the political spectrum believe that the US should remain the only superpower, but they are divided on how to maintain primacy – through what mix of diplomacy, military, and economic levers on the process.
How can the US win the support of a critical mass of friends and allies in the international system to offset the dynamism and mass of China? Is ever more feign aid, direct investment abroad, and military assistance required? If so, what are the implications for the domestic agenda?
As competition with China becomes more intense, Washington is responding by adopting industrial policy focusing on R&D and investment in priority areas. What role do Americans with their government to play in their domestic economy?
Is it realistic to expect meaningful cooperation from the PRC on world health, environmental and climate issues, counter-proliferation, and global economic system management?
Lampton then asks a sobering question: what does “dominance” even mean in a world falling apart?
(Pause for reflection)
He spends a good part of the rest of his essay addressing how we got to this point. Here are a few milestones he mentions:
Phase One began with the 1972 opening to China, led by President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. This was pursued by four administrations thereafter – Ford, Carter, Reagan, and GHW Bush. In this phase, the US joined with China to offset what was seen as surging Soviet power. The US provided China with weapons and other technological assistance during this time.
When the Soviet Union fell apart in 1989-91, a more difficult-to-manage phase of engagement began. The 1989 Tiananmen Square violence interjected the notion of human rights into bilateral relations. The implosion of the Soviet Union removed the common threat that had proven a strong adhesive in US-China relations previously.
Through the 1990s, China’s increased economic and military power led observers to fear that Beijing would become less observant of the post-World War II international order.
Following China’s 2001 entry into the World Trade Organization, the PRC comprehensive national power mounted rapidly and its confidence grew as American struggled with economic calamity (2008-09) and was bogged down in conflicts in the Middle East and Central Asia. By 2010, China had become noticeably more assertive in the South and East China Seas. In late 2001, the Obama administration initiated its “pivot to Asia,” signaling a more muscular turn in US policy n the region.
With Jinping in charge in China after 2013, and Trump becoming president in 2017, each country had a leader willing to change the frame of relations from “engagement” to “competition.” When Biden came to power, he did not roll back the contours of this changed policy.
In one important respect, however, Biden strengthened America where Trump had undermined it – alliance and partnership relations.
In another respect, Biden’s China policy also was a departure from Trump’s – he emphasized that the contest between China and the US was importantly about autocracy versus democracy.
There’s more to say about this topic – and the briefing book elaborates on other aspects. But this is all for today.
Here are some things you might want to read if you want to know more:
Blinken, Anthony J., The Administrations Approach to the People’s Republic of China. US Department of State, May 26, 2022. A comprehensive look at how the Biden Administration plans to engage Chine.
Rudd, Kevin, The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict Between the US and Xi Jinping’s China. New York: Public Affairs, March 22, 2022. A war between China and the United States would be catastrophic, deadly, and destructive. Unfortunately, it is no longer unthinkable.
Thurston, Anne F., ed, Engaging China: Fifty Years of Sino-American Relations. New York: Columbia University Press, 2021. Multidisciplinary and comprehensive. This is a vital reconsideration for a time when the stakes of US policy toward China have never been higher.
Look, Wonder Woman, you're not a slug. Everyone needs a two-hour drive to clear their mind. Take it easy there.